Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States there has been a renewed interest by various organizations to evaluate appropriate security measures to prepare for additional acts of terrorism. Acts of terrorism directed at drinking water have been reported previously. In response to these attacks the water industry has been encouraged to develop vulnerability assessment plans. In general, these plans focus on evaluating points of system vulnerability to terrorist attack via destruction of facilities or via introduction of contaminants into the system. While many water agencies have existing plans to address emergency response to catastrophic events (e.g., floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.), they typically do not focus on terrorist events involving intentional contamination with chemical, biological or radiological agents. Consequently, many utilities require external assistance from organizations with experience in developing security plans. Generally, these agencies have expertise in measures to protect against destruction of facilities but frequently lack expertise to address chemical, biological, or radiological agents. Indeed, this type of expertise is typically limited to the military or select government organizations. However, current events have necessitated dissemination of this information, but due to the classified nature of this issue it is extremely difficult for water agencies to acquire information on contaminants of concern. Furthermore, methods to detect chemical and biological agents in drinking water is limited or may not currently exist for some of the contaminants of concern. Consequently, development of effective monitoring and analytical strategies to complement vulnerability assessment plans is challenging. However, water utilities with laboratory facilities can implement effective intervention strategies but must address a number of critical issues. The objective of this paper is to discuss key issues including: what external agencies are available to provide technical and analytical assistance to the water industry; do these agencies comprehend analytical challenges associated with sampling from source or finished water sites; what is the appropriate balance between external analytical assistance and that currently available by water industry laboratories; should analytical capabilities of water industry laboratories be expanded to address contaminants of concern; what issues must be addressed when developing monitoring and sample collection strategies; and, what are the training and facilities requirements associated with monitoring for contaminants of concern? The paper also discusses the development of decision trees that allow an integrated response to contamination threat events between water utilities, security agencies, public health laboratories and government agencies. Includes extended abstract only.